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Recent research in macroeconomics has emphasized the importance of
linking the financial and real sectors and the need for working with
optimizing models. Tobin's Q model of investment would appear to provide a
framework that cansatisfythese two criteria. In contrast to the original
presentation of the Qmodel,the formal development has not recognized that
thefirm actively participates in a number of financial markets; in this
broader context, we show that Q Is likely to be an uninformative and
possiblymisleading signalforInvestment expenditures. We then endeavor
to turn this negative theoretical result to positive advantage in resolving
a number of empirical problems with Q models, but the modifications
dictated by the theory receive little support from the data.
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I.INTRODUCTION
Uncoveringthe channels through which financial and monetary variables
affect real behavior has been of considerable interest during the past few
years, as radical changes in financial markets and monetary policies have been
associated with sudden swings in macroeconomic activity. Following the
insights of Keynes(1936) aridTobin (1969), a number of researchers have
investigatedthese linkages using the Q model, which relates investment in
physical capital to the ratio of the market value of financial claims on the
firmandthe cost of reproducing its existing stock of capital.1 When thisQ
ratioexceeds unity, investors infinancial markets areindicating that
prospective cash flows are likely to be sufficiently high or discount rates
sufficleuLLy low to warrant additional capital spending.
The Q framework is particularly appealing because the abovementioned link
between financial variables and investment can be derived from a model of
forward—looking, maximizing behavior. Based on acash flow model inwhich the
firm faces convex costs in adjusting its capital stock, it has been shown that
physical investment is determined by marginal Q, defined as the ratio of the
discounted future revenues from an additional unit of capital (i.e., the shadow
price of capital) to its net—of—tax purchase price (Mussa, 1977; bel, 1979).
Critical to the empirical usefulness of this model is that unobservable
marginal Q must be related to observable average Q, defined above as the ratio
offinancial to physical capital. The conditions under which this connection
Fischerand Merton(19814, p. 83) state that "Q theory, associated particularly
withJamesTobin,...isnow the preferred theoretical description of
investment."2
can be drawn have been established in an important paper by Hayashl (1982).
From a theoretical perspective, Q Investment models are appealing because they
Incorporate forward—looking behavior, reflect optimal choices, and contain
estimated coefficients that are readily identified with underlying structural
parameters 2
In contrast to the original presentation of the Q model, the formal
development has not recognized that the firm actively participates In a number
offinancial markets. This paper develops amodel Inwhich the firm chooses,
not only the level of Investment expenditures, but also its debt and equity
policies. We find that endogenizing financial policy calls into question the
usefulness of the Q framework, andshow that Qis likely to be an uninformative
and perhaps misleading signal for investment expenditures.
This negative theoretical result, however, can have a potentially
positiveImpact on the empirical performance of conventional Q models, which
have been disappointing on three counts. First, contrary to the theory, lagged
variables have proven significant determinants of Investment;3 the
interpretation of these coefficients In terms of the underlying structural
model becomes unclear. Second, relative to alternative investment models, Q
has not performed adequately In terms of eitherwithin sample or out—of-sample
2SeeLucas (1976) and Sargent (1981) for a discussion of the advantages of
estimating and identifying structural parameters.
3For example, see von Furstenberg (1977) and Blanchard and Wyplosz (1981),
whose results are based on U.S. quarterly data. Significant lagged variables
have also emerged In studies of other countries (United Kingdom, Poterba and
Summers, 1983; MexIco, Schwartzrnan, 198's). Fischer (1983) has argued that
lagged Q should be an important determinant of Investment spending. There
are two objections to his result. First, he enters lags into the maximization
problembyassuming that adjustment costs depend on both current and lagged
investment, but it is not at all clear what phenomena are being captured by
this formulation. Second, the investment schedule that follows from his model
isquite different fran those actually used in econometric work, andthusthe
relation between his result andempirically significant lagged variables is not
apparent.3
statistics (Clark, 1979). Third, the implied structural parameters are quite
unreasonable. Forexample,Summers'(1981,P. 101) estimated adjustment cost
coefficient implied that, twenty years after an unexpected change in the
economic environment, the capital stock would have moved only three—fourths of
the way to its ultimate, steady—state value. In sum, these empirical problems
reveal a serious misspecificatiori in conventional formulations of the Q model.
Our analysis of endogenous financial policy allows us to link the specification
error to omitted variables and to exploit this additional information in
econometric estimation.
II. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
A. The Maximand and Conditions Characterizing an Qptimum
Webegin our analysisby assuming that, in formulating real and financial
policies,the managers of the firmactin the interests ofshareholdersand
maximize thevalue of equity subject to four constraints. First, the firm's
technology [L(t), K(t), 1(t), D(t), d(t)]) depends positively on labor (L(t))
and capital (K(t)) inputs, and negatively on the remaining three arguments. We
assume that, when Incorporating investment goods (1(t)) into the production
process, the firm incurs adjustment costs, which Increase at an increasing
rate. These internal costs can be viewed as the movement of real resources
from producing output toward Installing capital goods, and hence have a
deleterious effect on •[t]. We further assume that the presence of debt (D(t))
in the firm's capital structure creates agency problems (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Myers1 1977) that lead to restrictions on the firm's operations (e.g.,
1See Chirinko (1985, Section II.A) for a derivation of the equity value
niaximand from the cash flow identities characterizing the firm and for a
discussion of alternative cost of capital definitions.4
bond covenants) and have a negative effect on net revenues.5 These agency
costs annul the well—known capital structure invariance result of Modigliani
and Miller and, since we will be assuming that the demand for securities is
perfectly elastic, they are borne entirely by the firm. Negative effects on
[t] also arise from the issue of new debt (d(t)), reflecting flotation and
transactions costs. Throughout the analysis, we assume sufficient curvature
(Inada conditions) on [t] toensure interior solutions.6
Second,significant analytic convenience isachieved by assuming all debt
maturesin one period; hence, interest payments are determinedby a nominal
short—term rate. While a long—rate might seem preferable in analyzing
investment decisions, borrowers will be indifferent between a sequence of
one—period rates and along—term rate in the presence of perfect capital
markets linking the yields onsecuritiesof various maturities. We further
assumethat debt is retiredat anexponentialrate n and that the stock of debt
isaccumulated according to the following equation,
D(t) d(t) - D(t). (1)
Third, the cost of equity capital (p(t)) is constrained by the return
that investors require to hold financial assets. This return is determined by
the rates of taxation, inflation, and time preference faced by investors, and
thus p(t) is Invariant to the conduct of policies affecting physical investment
5A similar formulation has been employed by Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1981),
Gordon and Malkiel (1981), and Taggart (1985). While the introduction of
uncertainty would lead to a stronger motivation f or agency problems, such a
modification would preclude the derivation of the structural econometric model
estimated in Section III.
most tax systems, interest payments are deductible and, in this model, such
a "tax break" is needed to encourage the firm to issue debt despite thecosts reflected in [t].Explicit consideration of taxes has been avoided in the
theoreticalmodel forthesake of notational simplicity (cf., fn. 12).5
and debt finance.7
The final constraint governs the transition of the capital stock through
time,
K(t) 1(t) — (SK(t), (2)
where (S is the exponential depreciation rate.
To determine the real and financial policies that maximize the value of
equity subject to these fourconstraints,we form the current-value
Harniltonian,






wherew(s) and p(s) are the prices of labor services and investment goods,
respectively, relative to the price of output (the numeraire good), i(s) the
nominal short—term Interest rate, 11(8) the inflation rate, and A(s) and p(s)
the current—value co-state variables associated with the constraints (1) and
(2), respectIvely. Necessary conditions for the maximization of (3)are
obtained by applying Pontryagin's Maximum Principle and, for purposes of the






7See Chlrinko (1985, Section II.B andAppendix B) for an analysisofa dividend
policy equating the costs of retentions and new equity.6
A(t)= p(t)1[t]. (nb)
K[tJ>0,1[t]<O
Equation (na) defines the marginal benefit of an additional unit of capital as
the sum of currentandfuture marginal products weightedbythe rates of
discountanddepreciation. Alongthe optimal path, this marginal benefit must
equal the total marginal costs of acquiringcapital. These involve the sum of
purchase andmarginal adjustment costs, and the requisite equality Is
givenby (14b).
Unlike the stock of physical capital, the value to the firm of financial
capital is negative, as indicated by the following expressions for the shadow




jexp(—f(p(u)+n)du)El(s) —w(s)+— DD[s]]ds, (5b)
tt
D[t]<0,1<d[t]<O.
The marginal benefit of issuing debt equals the receipts (at par) less
flotation and transactions costs (5a). The marginal carrying costs of this
additional unit of debt are given in (5b) as real interest and retirement
payments plus the marginal agencycosts associated with debt, all discounted by
thecostof capital and weightedby the debt survival factor, exp(—fl).
Debt policy is conducted in order to equate the marginal costs of equity
and debt. This intuitively plausible result can be seen to hold in the present
model by differentiating (5b) with respect to time and rearranging,
-(t) -•-(p(t)+)i(t) -[i(t)-r(t)+- DLt]], (6a)
p(t)— [1+d[t]J] — +(t)/1.i(t), (6b)7
The left and right sides of equation (6b) define the costs of equity and debt,
respectively. The term in braces represents the marginal carrying costs of
debt grossed—up to reflect the loss due to flotation costs that reduce receipts
below the par value of debt. Retirement payments of n per dollar of real debt
lower future debt costs; in the absence of flotation costs, retirement payments
would disappear from (6b). The final term represents the capital gain or loss
arising from alterations in the stock of debt, and ensures that (6b) will hold
along the optimal path. In the steady—state where ii(t) =0(and ignoring
momentarily agency and flotation costs), the equality bet.ieen the costs of
equity and debt is apparent, p(t) =i(t)—ir(t).
B. Implications for Q Theory
A particularly attractive feature of Tobin's Q theory is that the
unobserved shadowpricefor physical investment can be linked uniquely and
rigorously to observable variables useful in econometric estimation. When
financial policy is endogenous, however, we show In this sub-section that such
a convenient relationship no longer holds. Key to our demonstration is
Proposition I, following from maximizing behavior, that defines the market
values of debt (D(t)) and equity (V(t)) in terms of current—period stocks and
shadow prices,
PROPOSITION I (the financial value of the firm)
Inthe presence of perfectly competitive output andfactormarkets,
SJ(t)+ D(t) —A(t) K(t)+(.i(t)+1)D(t) (7)
it andonlyit
•[L(t),K(t),I(t),D(t),d(t)) Is homogeneous of degree one in all arguments
andexponentIalrates govern the depreciation of K(t) andtheretirement of D(t) 08
In (7), the capitalized value of the firm equals the flow of income to be
generated by the existing stock of capital plus the flotation andtransaction
costs that have been absorbed in order to attain the current level of debt.
Under certain restrictions, it has been shown that physical investment is
related to the ratio of the shadow price of capital to the relative price of
investment goods (Mussa, 1977; Abel, 1979). This ratio is referred to as
marginal Q (Q(t)) but, since the shadow price of capital is unobservable,
QM(t)isnotoperationally useful. This problem hasbeen overcome in empirical
work by replacing marginal Q with average Q (QA(t)), defined as "the ratio of
the market value of firms to the replacement cost of their assets" (von
Furstenberg, 1977, p. 3i7). In terms of our notation, these two definitions
can be stated as follows,
QM(t) =A(t)/ p(t), (8a)
QA(t) —(V(t)+D(t))/ p(t) K(t) (8b)
and when combined with (7), lead to the following result,
PROPOSITION II (marginal Q and average Q)
QM(t) —QA(t)
—(p(t)+1)*(D(t)/p(t)K(t)). (9)
Proposition II indicates that QM(t), which serves as the signal for alterations
in K(t), is related to QA(t) and an additional term containing an unobserved
shadow price. When financial policy is exogenous, this latter term does not
appear, and marginal and average Q areequivalent.9However, in the presence
proof is contained in Chirinko (1985, Apppendix A); cf., Hayashi (1982).
9See Summers (1981), Poterba and Summers (1983), and Chirinko (1984) for
derivations with exogenous financial policy. Under the current tax code,
average Q will have to be decremented by the discounted value of tax
depreciationallowances that are attributable to capital assets purchased prior
to period t but that will bechargedagainst income incurrentand future
(Footnote continued)9
of endogenous financial decisions, QA(t) no longerproves to be a "sufficient
statistic" for indicating profitable investment opportunities in physical
capital.1°
Not only can QA(t) be uninformative, it may also be misleading. In order
to demonstrate that QA(t) can increase while QM(t) remains fixed, we assume




wherethe 's capture production, adjustment cost, and agency/flotation cost




periods (Hayashi, 1982). The computation of thediscounted values associated
withtax depreciation will involve variables unknownattime t. and thus attenuatethe desirable informational properties of the Qmodel.Since the
primaryvariation in Q is likely to be due to other factors, it is doubtful thatthisproblem will have much influence on econometric estimates.
10A8 discussed in Chirinko (1982a, 198Z1)and Wildasin (1984), QA(t) is also not
a "sufficient statistic" when the firm's production possibilities depend on




where the dashed lines represent the saddlepoint paths to the steady—states.11
Assume that the firm is in a steady-state (A) and that the nominal rate of
interest it pays on debt unexpectedly decreases.12 In this scenario, (5b)
implies that the fall in i(t) will lower initially the marginal cost of debt
finance (-i(t)); in terms of the diagram, -ii(t) falls instantaneously from A to
B on the transition path to the new steady-state (C). From (14a) and under our
separability assumptions, A(t) and QM(t) will be unaffected. Immediately after
the fall in 1(t) and —i(t) but before the firm can alter D(t),QA(t) must rise
in order to maintain (9) and to reflect the cheaper finance now available to
the firm.13 As the firm acquires debt along the transition path to the new
steady—state, both —j.i(t) and D(t) will rise, and \1(t)willfall until QA(t)
retains its steady-state value. Between steady-states, QA(t) would have been
signaling profitable investment opportunities In financial, not physical,
capital. Thus, relating the flow of physical investment to QA(t), as is done
in conventional specifications of Q models, may meet with only limited
The phase diagram is basedon the following properties for 3[D(t), d(t)]:
=[t]> 0,dd[t] dd[t] > 0,'D[t] =Lt]> 0,
DDLt]D[t]> 0. See Chirinko (1985, Appendix C) for a more detailed
discussionofthe phase diagram.
we interpret 1(t) as thenet—of—tax Interestrate,then this unexpected
changecould be dueto government policies that alter the degree to which interestpayments may be deducted against business income or the rate of
business incometaxation. (Examples of both of these changes canbe found in
tax reform proposals advanced by the Reagan Administration.) With additional
notation, it is straightforward to incorporate taxes into the Hamiltonian (3).
131nterms of the notation, we have that dQA(t) -dV(t)--d(-(t))D(t)> 0.11
empirical success. However, as demonstrated in the next section, we will be
ableto regain a useful structural relationship by conditioning on variables
associated with debt finance.
III.THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
A. Specification Issues
In this section, we exploit the information provided by the model with
endogenous financial policy, andgenerateestimates of the structural
parameters. To translate the theoretical model of Section II intoan
econometric equation, we need to paraxneterize theadjustmentcost and
flotation/agencycost functions.Weassumethatadjustment costs depend on net
investment,
(/2)[I(t)/K(t) —K(t), (11)
wherearid tS are unknown parameters to be estimated. Differentiating (11)
with respect to 1(t), inserting the result into (14b), and utilizing (7), we
obtain the following investment relationship,
1(t) s K(t) +(1/ct)Q(t) —(1/ct)(p(t)+1) D(t), (12)
Q(t) V(t) +D(t)
—p(t)K(t),
where cz(t) is the difference between the financial value of the firm and its
replacement cost. (This latter term is closely related to QA(t); if adjustment
costs were valued by the price of investment goods rather than output, (t) in
(12) would be replaced by QA(t).) The first term in (12) represents
replacement investment, which is proportional to the capital stock; (t)
indicates the profitable level of investment activity —bothphysical and
financial -forthe firm. The last term is the unobservable shadow price12
associated with debt,and representsflotation costs that are positively
related to Q(t). Thus, for a given movement in c2(t), the amountofresources
available for additions to physical capital will be lowered by the costs
associated with the flow of debt used to finance the marginalproject.It
should be noted that (12) will be immunefromthe problem discussed in Section
II.Bof QA(t) generatingmisleading signals. Under thatscenario, dV(t)
-d(—i(t))D(t) (cf., fn. 13), and dI(t) calculated from (12) would be zero.
Conventional formulations of the Q model have ignored the effect of endogenous
financial policy and, in order to gauge its importance on econometric
estimates, we postulate the following agency/flotation cost function,
•3(D(t),d(t))= D(t)°d(t)1, (13)
1>0, a>0, D(t)>0, d(t)>0
where aaridyareparan:Ieters to be estimated. It should be noted that both
(11) and (13) satisfy the curvature properties on '[tJdiscussedin the text.1
Anadditionalassumption underlying the Propositions I and II was that
the (J's were all homogeneous of degree one. While this assumption may be
plausible for the production and adjustment cost technologies, it is arguably
inappropriate in regard to debt-related costs. If flotation and agency costs
have a large fixed—cost component, then a÷Y may be less than one; if marginal
flotation costs are positive and agency costs increase at an increasing rate,
then aY may be greater than one. To allow for the possibility that a+11,
Propositions I and II are restated as follows,
1Shoulddd=3d)O, then the firm would be willing to supply an infinite
amountofdebt n order to exploit the concavity in its cost structure. To
eliminate this possibility, we impose legal constraints against paying
dividends in excess of (long-run) operating profits and accumulating excess
funds within the firm. In this case, the firm's additional debt issues mu8t be
used to finance investment, which, if the adjustment cost function is
sufficientlyconvex, will boundd(t)<'.13
PROPOSITION I' (the financial value of the firm)
Given the assumptions in Proposition I,
V(t) +D(t)=x(t)K(t) +(j(t)÷1)D(t) +




and42(I(t),K(t)) are homogeneous of degree one in all
arguments, c(D(t),d(t)) is homogeneous of degree o1, and exponential rates
govern the depreciation of K(t) and the retirement of D(t).




Note that Propositions I and II are special cases of Propositions I' and II'
when ai=1 ((t)=O), and thus it will be straightforward to test the assumption
of Increasing debt costs. When we allow for the possibility of this more
general situation, the marginal value of an additional unit of physical capital
is lowered by the differential debt costs —thosethat differ from constant
average cost —summedand discounted over the life of the firm. Since X(t)
extends over an infinite horizon, QM(t) in (15) is related to both current and
future variables. Believing that a substantial amount of the variation in x(t)
can be captured by current movements in the rate of discount and stock of debt,
we compute (t) under the assumption that p(s)=p(t), D(s)D(t), and d(s)—nD(t),
for all s>t. Differentiating (13) with respect to d(t), inserting the result
into (5a), and utilizing (1), (8), (12), (13), and (15), we obtain the
following structural econometric equation,1'4
1(t) / K(t) +(1/ct)c1(t) / K(t)
-(1/ci)[(t),D(t)+n 1 D0+YIK(t)
(16) —(aY—1)(1/ct) n [D(t)a+Y / p(t)] / K(t)
+, I(t—1)/ K(t) +
whereall terms have been scaled by K(t) to avoid the spurious correlation
possible with variables trending upward over time (Granger andNewbold,19714).
Ourreviewof estimated Q models indicated that lagged variables have proven
significant, andthelagged flow of physical investment has been added to (16)
to capture any dynamic effects not fully accounted for by the adjustmentcost
technology.15 A significant value ofipcanbe interpreted as a signof
misspecltication in our econometric model. Lastly, c(t) is a white—noise error
term that reflects non—systematic variations in 1(t) and approximationerrors
that have arisen in the development of the model.
Equation (16) stands in sharp contrast to previously estimated investment
models utilizing an adjustment cost technology (11) but maintainingan
exogenous financial policy. In the latter case, debt ratios affect investment
decisions through the purchase price of new capital (p(t)) in muchthe same way
as investment tax credits.16 If the cost of debt is lower thanequity, the
marginal investment expenditure receives a subsidy equal to the capitalized
difference in financing costs, a profit opportunity that firms constrainedby
an exogenous financial policy fail to exploit. When the choice offinancing is
151t should be noted that theaddition of the lagged dependent variable
compromises the structural interpretation of (16).
l6See Ch.trinko(19814), whose formula differs from that of Summers (1981) and
Poterba and Summers (1983). The current analysis suggests thatPoterba and
Summers' tests of the effects of dividend taxation within the Q frameworkmay
be biased by their assumption of an exogenous financialpolicy. For example,
in 1965, changes in the United Kingdom tax code penalized dividendswhile
favoring debt finance (King, 1977, Table 7.1).15
determinedsimultaneously with physical investment, the profit opportunity
vanishes, and(16)indicates that the conventional Q model is misspecif led. It
is possible that the emergence of significant lagged variables in previously
estimatedQ models and their generally disappointing empirical performance may
be due to the omitted debt terms in (16). Furthermore, a standard analysis of
omitted variables bias suggests that the conventional Q specification is likely
to generate estimated values of the adjustment cost parameter (ce)thatare
biased upward.17 Whether endogenizing financial policy within the Q framework
mitigates someofthese empiricalproblems isconsidered in light of the
econometricresults presented in the next sub—section.
B. Econometric Results
The structural equation following from the theoretical model was
estimatedwith annual data for the nonfinancial corporate sector over the
period 1950—1981. The length of the sample was dictated by data availability,
and detailed information concerning data sources is contained in the Glossary.
While the theory implies that all capital inputs affecting the firm shouldbe
includedin the series for the capital stock and investment flow, data
availability forces us to define capital as either equipment +structures(the
ES model) or equipment +structures÷inventories(the ESI model). As we shall
see, the lessons to be drawn from this paper are robustwith respect to the
definitionof capital.
Estimates of the nonlinear model (16) are presented in Table I, and are
computedby full information maximum likelihood, which, under the present
circumstances, is equivalent to nonlinear least squares.18 A number of the
17Thls conclusion is based on the assumption of a positive correlation between
[(t)/K(t)]and[(d(t)/D(t))1D(t)/K(t)] and onthe constrainta—i—I,where I





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































empirical problems with the conventional Q model (columns 1 and 4) are readily
apparent -the are low, the lagged dependent variable in the ES model is
significant, and the residuals are serially correlated.19 Furthermore, the ci's
are larger than the value underlying the simulation result cited in Section I,
and thus they imply a very slow response of the capital stock to unexpected
changes in the economic environment.20 Adjusted f or the difference in the mean
of c2(t) between the ES and ESI models, thefor the conventional ES model
becomes 109.2 and, consistent with the adjustment cost interpretation of this
parameter, indicates that the problem of long adjustment paths is more serious
when we confine our attention to fixed capital.
The extent to which the analysis of financial policy alleviates these
problemscan beassessed in a number of ways. The Q model with endogenous
financialpolicynests the conventional specification, and the parametric
restrictions can be analyzed by a sequential testing procedure. In particular,
we can evaluate the following three hypotheses stated in terms of I and a:
lBSee the Appendix for a discussion of estimation issues and for additional
tables. Note that n has beensetto .15 in all of the reported estimates.
19Seria]. correlation is assessed by the rn—statistic, distributed t under the
null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The rn—statistic is calculated in a
regression of the residuals from an equation with a lagged dependent variable (16)
on all of the explanatory variables in the initial regression plus the lagged
residual; m is the t—statistic on the lagged residual. Performing a t—test on
this coefficient is asymptotically equivalent to the Durbinh—test.However,
it can be calculated f or all possible values of the estimated parameters, and
hasperformedbetter than the h-statistic in Monte Carlo experiments (Harvey,
1981, P. 276).
20Summers' (1981) preferred estimate of a is 32.258. AdJusted for the
difference in the means of (t), the comparable a's from Table I are 133.761
and 102.538 for the ES and ESI models, respectively.18
H3:1=1, a=a -.;=1a; General
H2: y, a1— +=i; ConstantReturns to Scale in
H1: 1=0, a=1 -a1; Conventional
where the "j"denotesestimated values, a is defined as the sum of' I and a,
andthe subscripts on H correspond to columns 1—3f or the ES model or columns
14—6forthe ESI model, respectively. The hypothesesareevaluatedin
increasingorder of restrictiveness by likelihood ratio tests, andan advantage
of this procedure is that the incremental test statistics areallindependent
in large samples (Harvey, 1981, pp. 1814—185). For both the ES andESI models,
therestrictions characterizing the conventional modelare sustainedthrough
bothsteps of the sequential testing procedure at the 5%level, which implies a
nominalsignificance level of 9.75% for the test of the conventional versus
general Q specification. Complementary evidence is provided by the
rn—statistic, indicating that the serial correlation in the residuals remains
when the debt—related variables are introduced. This problem is not mitigated
byimposinga second lag ofthedependent variable (see Table A—I in the
Appendix). Combined with negative (though insignificant) a's and largely
unchanged ci's, these results suggest strongly that the source of
misspecification in Q models is not related to the treatment of financial
policy.
One possible problem with these results Isthatthey may beaffectedby
simultaneity bias. In (16), all ofthe stock andasset price variables are
dated at the beginning of the period; hence, the only variable that might be
correlated with the error term is the current flow ofdebt.Nonlinear
instrinental variable estimates are presented in Table II, and the results are











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Stepping outside of the formal model, we consider the impact of two
additional variables that may be significant determinants of spending forfixed
investment.22 First, an important assumptionimplicitin ourderivationof the
investmentequation was that the firm was always able to equate the marginal
costs of alternative sources of finance. During those periods when the firm
maynot have ready entree to the capital markets, the presence of internal
fundsmay prove important in financing investment expenditures and, totest
theirimportance, current cash flow Is entered as an additional regressor. The
results aredisplayedfor the ES model in the first three columns of Table III,
and reveal a significant role for liquidity but at the expense of c2(t).When
the model is estimated with Instrumental variables, however, this significant
effectdisappears.23Second, while demand conditions are explicitly accounted
for in the derivation of the Q model, It is possible that (t) is unable to
capture the full extent of this influence. For the ES model In Table IV, the
demandvariablethe percentage change in the constant dollar gross domestic
product of nonfinancial corporations —enterswith a positive and significant
21Theinstrument set comprised a constant, time trend, the level of output
lagged one period, (t)/K(t), D(t)/K(t), and I(t—1)/K(t). The results reported
in Table II were robust with respect to variations In the Instrument list. In
the presence of serially correlated residuals, It would be preferable to lag
the instruments an additional period. However, the correlations between these
instrumentsand the variables in (16) were too weak to deliver anyreliable
results.
22Parallelresults for the ESI model can be found in the Appendix. For both
the ES and ESI models, 2(t-1)/K(t) and a time trend were entered separately as
additional regressors, both of which were significant and led to a substantial
decline in cz.Visual inspection of the residuals from a number of regressions
revealed a large, negative residual recurring in 1958. Except for a rejection
of H versus H at the 5% level in the ESI model, the use of a dummy variable
for 1'958 had lttle effect on the results of interest.
result wouldnot appear to be due to weak instruments, as the R2between
theliquidity variable and a constant, time trend, the level of Output lagged
one period, (t)/K(t), D(t)/K(t), I(t—1)/K(t), and LIQ(t—1)/K(t) is .70 and.79





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































coefficient and serial correlation in the residuals disappears. The estimated
value ofis raised substantially, but becomes insignificant. Unlike the
results for liquidity, the demand variable remains significant with
instrunental variables, confirming the often—observed sensitivity of investment
spending to demand.24
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Recent research in macroeconomics has emphasized the need for working
with optimizing models and the importance of linking the financial and real
sectors of the economy. Tobin's Q model of investment would appear to provide
aframework that could satisfy these two criteria. However, when the firm
actively participates in more thanonefinancial market, we have shown that Q
is likely to be an uninformative andpossiblymisleading signalforinvestment
expenditures.
We have endeavored to turn this negative theoretical result to positive
advantage in resolving a number of problems with the empirical performance of Q
models. In the presence of eridogenous financial policy, a structural
investment model canbepreserved as long as the estimates are conditioned on
debt-related variables. Unfortunately, such modifications to the conventional
Q model receive little support frQn the data. Relative to the specification
incorporating endogenous financial policy, the conventional Q model was
sustainedin asequential testing procedure, and anumber of empirical problems
remainedunder the more general specification -slowadjustment speeds,
significant lagged variables, andseriallycorrelated residuals. In addition,
demand conditions, proxied by the percentage change in output, proved quite
significant at the expense of the Q variable. Thus, on both theoretical and
empirical grounds andcontraryto the sanguine view expressed recently by
Fischer andMerton(198'4), we conclude that Qtheoryis unlikely to provide the
basis for a satisfactory investment model linking the financial andreal
sectors.Whether a suitable framework isto be foundbymodifying the
adjustmentcost technology or by Introducing additional dynamic elements
remains an open question for future research.25
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GLOSSARY AND DATA SOURCES
For ease of exposition, the model developed in the text avoided
considering taxes, an omission that can not be maintained in the econometric
analysis. Tax variables enter the structural econometric model (16)only
through c(t), and three modifications arenecessary—loweringthe replacement
cost of capital to reflect the subsidies provided by the investmentcredit and
depreciation allowances; adjusting the price of output to reflect the rate of
corporate income taxation; and subtracting from c2(t) the value of tax
depreciation allowances on real assets purchased prior to t. The calculation
of this latter term is somewhat involved, and the use of available serieswould
have shortened the sample period. Since the bulk of the variation in(t) is
attributable to the financial assets, the adjustment for the value of existing
depreciationallowances has not been made. Comparing regressions based on this
adjustment to those contained in Table I indicates that the results, while
slightly improved, are not appreciably affected. The correlation of Q(t)'s
with and without this adjustment is always greater than .95 (time series for
the value ofexistingdepreciation allowances were taken from CO and HA). As
faras possible, all data pertain to the nonfinancial corporate sector.
Sourcesanddescriptionsof the series used in the estimation are detailed
below.G-2
SOURCES
BAL —Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Balance Sheets
forthe U.S. Economy, 19115—82," (October 1983).
BEAU-Unpublisheddata provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
BS U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business
Statistics (1982, 1971).
CO —Corcoran,Patrick J., "Inflation, Taxes, and the Composition of
Business Investment," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarter]y
Review 14 (Autumn 1979), 13—211, and unpublished data provided by
the author.
CS —Corcoran,Patrick J., and Sahllng, Leonard, "Business Tax Policy
in the United States: 1955—1980," Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Research Paper No. 8102 (September 1981), and unpublished data
provided by the authors.
HA -Hayashi,Fumio, "Tobin's Marginal q and Average q," Econometrica 50
(January1982),p. 222, Table I.
NIPA-U.S.Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis:
(1979—1982), Survey of Current Business 63 (July 1983);
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United States 1929—1976 Statistical Tables (September 1981).
ST —Seater,John J.,"Marginal Federal PersonalandCorporate Income
TaxRatesin the U.S., 1909—1975," Journal of Monetary Economics
10 (November 1982), 361—381.
S&P —Standard& Poor's Statistical Service, Security Price Index Record,
1981!.
VF —vonFurstenberg, George M., "CorporateInvestment: Does Market
Valuation Matter in the Aggregate?," Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity (1977:2), 3147—397G— 3
DEFINITIONS
D =Constantdollar market value of debt issued by nonfinancial
corporate business, beginning of the period (BOP): D$ /
Pgflp.
=Currentdollar market value ofdebtissued by nonfinancial
corporate business,BOP: (NETINT *(MIP/ INT)) / 1).
DIV =Currentdollar dividends for nonfinancialcorporatebusiness, SOP:
NIPA, Table(T)1.13, Line(L)31.
DSPC =Standard& Poor's dividend—common stock price ratio, BOP:
S&P, p. 127.
DSP =Standard& Poor's dividend—preferred stock price ratio, SOP: p
p. 118.
i =Moody'snominal interest rate on corporate Aaa bonds, BOP:
NIPA S—16 andBS.
Ii Constant dollarinvestment fornonfinancial corporate business
(jequipment,structures, inventories), flow for the current
period: BEAU.
INT Current dollar net interest paid by nonfinancial corporate
business, flow for the previous period: NIPA, T1.13, L35.
kes
=Rateof investment credit for equipment and structures, average
for the period (AVG): CS, p. 514.
K. Constantdollar replacement value of the capital stock for
nonfinancial corporate business (jequipment,structures,
inventories),BOP: BEAU.
Current dollar replacement value ofthe capital stock for
nonfinancial corporate business (jequipment,structures,
inventories), BOP: BAL, T705, LII.
LIQ Constant dollar cash flow, defined as after—tax corporate profits
without inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments for
nonfinancial corporate business divided by the implicit price
deflator for gross national product for the middle of the period,
flow for the current period: NIPA, T.1.13, L30 divided by Pgnp
(adjusted to the middle of the period).
MIP Current dollar net monetary interestpaidby nonfinancial corporate
business, flow for the previous period: NIPA, T8.7, L7 less L25.
NETINT-Currentdollar net interest paidbynonfinancial corporate
business, BOP:NIPA, T.1.13, L35.G- 4
NFA =Currentdollar noninterest bearing net financial assets of
nonfinancialcorporatebusiness, BOP: BAL 1705, L9, L16, LiT, L18,
less L37, L38, L39.
Pgflp Implicit price deflator for grossnationalproduct, BOP: MIPA,
T7.i, Li.
p =Shareholders'real rate of discount, BOP: (wDSP + div c
(1-w)DSP )+.032,where the latter numberequals the average
percentage increase inStandard & Poor's stock price index less
therate of inflation over the sample period.
TXTOT=Currentdollar property tax accruals to state andlocal
pgovernments, total, AVG: NIPA, 13.5, L214.
tc
=Rateof taxation of corporate income, AVG: + — TfT5.
=Rateof federal taxation of corporate income, AVG: ST, T2, C6.
Rate of taxation of property, AVG: TXTOT multiplied by (BAL,
T701, L7, Li3, plusL25less L8 less L15)
Rate of state andlocaltaxation of corporate income, AVG:
NIPA, 13.3, L6 divided by NIPA, T1.12, L8 plus TXT0T.
Tes
=Taxeffects on capital services, equipment andstructures,AVG:
(1 +T(i1))* (1—
kes tcZes)•
tj -Taxeffects on capital services, inventories, AVG:
Ci
—iexp[—cg*.25*.75]),where cg isthenominal capital gain
on invntories, .25 is the age of the inventory stock, and .75 is
the percentage of the value of inventories under first—in,
first—out accounting methods.
V-Constantdollar market value of equity for nonfinancial corporate
business, BOP: V$ /
=Currentdollar market value of equity fornonfinancialcorporate
business, BOP: DIV / (wdi DSPc +(1div)DSP).
Difference between the value of the firm evaluated on financial




—Percentageof dividends paid on commonstock, MG: VF, p. 358, fn.
11, extended for thecurrentstudy.
Y Constant dollar grossdomestic product fornonfinancialcorporate
business,flow for the current period: NIPA, Ti.13, L36.
Zes =Presentdiscounted value of current and future tax depreciation
allowancesper dollar of currentinvestment in equipment and
structures,AVG: CS, Appendix E.A-i
APPENDIX. ESTIMATION ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS
All computations were performed with version 14.OE of' TSP on the VAX 780
at the Hoover Institution. The Davidon—Fleteher--powell algorithm was used, and
the convergence criteria was set at .05 percent. In order to obtain consistent
estimates of the standard errors, the converged model was iterated an
additional time using the method proposed by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman
(197L). These were generally larger than those obtained under nonlinear least
squares.
Two problems were encountered in performing the computations. First,
direct estimates of n were not obtainable, and a grid search was conductedover
a range of admissible values. This range was restricted by the flotation/
agency cost function (13), which, if d(t)>0, implies that r)>—D(t)/D(t). Given
our time series for D(t), r must equal or exceed .15, a value implying that,
after 20 years, 95% of a debt issue would be retired. The modelwas estimated
for 's between .15 and .30 in increments of .01, and the likelihood function
was very flat over this range. For both the ES and ESI models, the likelihood
function generally increases in ri and reaches a maximum at ri-.30,though the
absolute difference between the log likelihoods evaluated at n-.15 andri—.30 is
less than .126. Since r.15 provides a reasonable pattern of debtretirements,
it is used in all of the reported estimates. Second, in the mostgeneral model
with I and a entering freely, the data were not rich enough topermit direct
and accurate estimates of these parameters. To avoid the large standarderrors
that occurred in some instances, we defined aI÷a,obtainedestimates of I and
a,andcalculated a in terms of these directly estimated parameters. Estimates
of the other model parameters remain largely unaffected under either estimation
technique.
Additional estimates of (16) are presented in the following tables.*
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